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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
Alan Daniel Burtness appeals from the district court's Judgment And Sentence
wherein the district court imposed upon Mr. Burtness a unified sentence of ten years,
with three years fixed, following his conviction for aggravated battery.

Mr. Burtness

submits that the State violated his right to a fair trial by vouching for the State's
witnesses and the district court erred when it denied the motion for mistrial.

Statement of the Facts
Long time friends Alan Burtness and Daniel McCullough were drinking alcohol on
January 19, 2010. 1

(Tr., p.215, L.24-p.216, L.3, p.240, Ls.17-22.)

Mr. McCullough's parents had kicked him out of their home.
Ls.8-13, p.250, Ls.17-19, p.415, Ls.14-17.)

Early that day,

(Tr., p.218, L.2, p.248,

Mr. Burtness' house is approximately a

block and one-half from Mr. McCullough's parents' home. (Tr., p.216, Ls.14-20.) After
his parents told him to leave the residence, Mr. McCullough retreated to Mr. Burtness'
house for a portion of the day. (Tr., p.218, Ls.3-8.)
In the early evening, Mr. McCullough's friend, Valerie Reichart, arrived at
Mr. Burtness' residence.

(Tr.,

p.219, L.24-p.220, L.5.)

Mr. McCullough met

Ms. Reichart in the driveway and invited her into the home. (Tr., p.220, Ls.13-16, p.252,
Ls.12-13, p.252, L.25-p.253, L.3.) Ms. Reichart believed Mr. McCullough was drunk.
(Tr., p.177, Ls.19, 25.) According to her, Mr. McCullough's daughter, Mr. Burtness' two
boys and Mr. Burtness' girlfriend were all at the house. (Tr., p.180, L.19-p.181, L.4.)

1

Both men are about 38 years old.
generated appellate record, pp.4, 23.)

(See State v. Burtness PSl.pdf, computer

1

Mr. McCullough and Ms. Reichart were in the living room for about fifteen
minutes before Mr. McCullough went to Mr. Burtness' bedroom. (Tr., p.182, Ls.6-10,
p.221, Ls.18-22.)

Although all individuals dispute how the fight started, eventually

Mr. Burtness and Mr. McCullough agree that the two were wrestling on the ground with
a knife. 2 (Tr., p.229, Ls.6-11, Tr.423, p., Ls.2-6.) However, because Mr. Burtness had
asserted self-defense, each of the different witnesses' versions was relevant to the
ultimate determination of guilt.

Essentially, the State's witnesses claimed that

Mr. McCullough had not started the fight and Mr. Burtness cut him for no apparent
reason.

The Defense's witnesses claimed that Mr. McCullough had started the

altercation, pushing, hitting, threatening Mr. Burtness with a knife, and ultimately cut him
prior to Mr. Burtness' reaction.

1.

Alan Burtness' Version
Mr. Burtness explained that Mr. McCullough had entered his bedroom and was

playing with a knife. (Tr., p.420, Ls.20-25.) When Mr. McCullough began using vulgar
language towards Mr. Burtness' girlfriend, Ms. Jewett, Mr. Burtness stood up and
attempted to stop the altercation between the two. (Tr., p.422, Ls.2-7.) Mr. McCullough
then spun around and cut Mr. Burtness with the knife. (Tr., p.422, Ls.13-18.) Once the
knife had cut Mr. Burtness' eye area, he pushed Mr. McCullough back and tried to
escape. (Tr., p.423, Ls.2-5.) Mr. McCullough then punched Mr. Burtness in the nose,
breaking it, causing him to fall backward, only to hit the porcelain tile. (Tr., p.423, Ls.4-

2

Mr. McCullough claims that Mr. Burtness immediately became irate when he entered
the bedroom and, then, Mr. Burtness grabbed a knife and swung it at his face.
(Tr., p.222, Ls.7-14, p.260, Ls.9-13.) Mr. McCullough claimed to have attempted to stop
the knife with his hand, grabbing it with his palm, resulting in a laceration to his hand.
(Tr., p.223, L.17-p.224, L.4.) Thereafter, the two were wrestling on the ground with the
knife. (Tr., p.229, Ls.6-9.)
2

9, p.439, Ls.12-14.) The police officer saw a cut at the bridge of Mr. Burtness' nose and
general puffiness around his nose. (Tr., p.150, Ls.2-5; See Defendant's Exhibit B, p.2
of the State v. Burtness PSI, computer generated record.)
Mr. Burtness next realized that Mr. McCullough was on top of him, holding a knife
to his neck.

3

(Tr., p.424, Ls.13-16.) While pinned to the ground, Mr. McCullough struck

Mr. Burtness in the head a couple of times. (Tr., p.427, Ls.13-15, p.428, Ls.9-13.)
When Mr. McCullough told Mr. Burtness that he was going to kill him, Mr. Burtness told
his girlfriend to call 911.

(Tr., p.431, Ls.23-25.)

During this exchange, Ms. Reichart

entered the room, demanded that Mr. McCullough leave, pulled him off Mr. Burtness,
and told everyone not to call 911. (Tr., p.429, Ls.11-17, p.431, Ls.23-25.) Mr. Burtness
believes that while he pushed

Mr.

McCullough up,

Mr. McCullough's arm resulting in the cut arm muscle.

he pushed the knife into
(Tr., p.432, Ls.17-23, p.433,

Ls.12-13.) After Mr. McCullough dropped the knife, Mr. Burtness obtained it and swung
at Mr. McCullough. (Tr., p.433, Ls.16-19.)

Mr. Burtness thought the knife might have

grazed Mr. McCullough. (Tr., p.435, Ls.12-14.)

2.

Jennifer Jewett's Version (Only Witness Present During The Entire Fight)
Mr. Burtness and Ms. Jewett reside together; they have dated for approximately

five years.

(Tr., p.353, Ls.12-14, p.354, Ls.16-19.)

She recalls that she and

Mr. Burtness were in their bedroom when Mr. McCullough entered. (Tr., p.356, Ls.1112, p.360, Ls.8-10.) Ms. Jewett believed that Mr. McCullough was upset with her about
an incident that had occurred earlier in the day.

3

(Tr., p.359, Ls.20-22, p.360, Ls.4-7.)

Officer Gillmore also testified that Mr. Burtness told the police that night that
Mr. McCullough was on top of him with a knife pushed up against his throat; he was
able to get Mr. McCullough off him by pushing on him as hard as he could. (Tr., p.109,
Ls.6-7.)
3

Before making some remarks to her, Mr. McCullough had picked up Mr. Burtness' knife
that was lying on IVlr. Burtness' table, and was playing with it. (Tr., p.363, L.24-p.364,
L.12, p.365, Ls.1-25.)

When Mr. McCullough made some remark to Ms. Jewett,

Mr. Burtness stood up and tried to intervene.

(Tr., p.366, Ls.6-8.)

pushed Mr. Burtness to the ground, striking him.

Mr. McCullough

(Tr., p.363, Ls.19-23.)

During this

wrestling-pushing event, Mr. McCullough cut Mr. Burtness on his nose.

(Tr., p.367,

Ls.3-10, 22-24.) Once on the ground, Mr. McCullough was on top of Mr. Burtness and
held the knife to Mr. Burtness' throat. (Tr., p.368, Ls.16-25.) Mr. Burtness kept asking
Ms. Jewett to call 911. (Tr., p.369, Ls.18-25.) While the two men were still fighting on
the floor, Ms. Reichart came in, and instructed Mr. McCullough to stop fighting.
(Tr., p.395, Ls.12-16.) While the men were being pulled apart, Mr. Burtness obtained
possession of the knife.
being removed,

(Tr., p.373, Ls.12-14.)

With the weight of Mr. McCullough

Mr. Burtness sat up and swung the knife at Mr. McCullough.

(Tr., p.375, Ls.3-6, p.395, L.24-p.395, L.2.)

3.

Mr. McCullough's Version
Mr. McCullough testified that almost immediately when he entered Mr. Burtness'

room, Mr. Burtness became irate, grabbed a big knife, and swung it at him. (Tr., p.221,
L.25-p.222, L.14, p.223, Ls.4-11, p.260, Ls.9-13.) Mr. McCullough grabbed the blade of
the

knife and

wrestled

Mr.

Burtness to the

ground.

(Tr.,

p.223,

Ls.17-21.)

Mr. McCullough denied ever punching Mr. Burtness. (Tr., p.232, L.24-p.233, L.1, p.267,
Ls.21-23.) Sometime while wrestling on the ground, Ms. Reichart appeared from the
living room.

(Tr., p.266, Ls.8-12.) Mr. McCullough testified that he pushed off to get

away, turned around and ran out the door. (Tr., p.231, Ls.17-22.) After running towards
the living room, Mr. McCullough testified that he turned around and Mr. Burtness was
4

there and slashed his forearm.

(Tr., p.232, Ls.18-25.)

muscles and part of his bicep were cut.

Mr. McCullough's extensor

(Tr., p.236, Ls.1-3.)

Mr. McCullough also

testified that he exited the residence and Mr. Burtness followed him, cutting him with his
knife on his back.

(Tr., p.240, Ls.1-7.) Mr. McCullough tried to explain that he might

have "punched [Mr. Burtness] out when we were outside in the back." (Tr., p.278.)

4.

l\/1s. Reichart's Version
When Ms. Reichart heard a scuffle, she ran back to the bedroom and witnessed

Mr. McCullough and Mr. Burtness fighting on the floor.
Mr.

(Tr., p.183, L.24-p.184, L.1.)

McCullough was more on top; Mr. McCullough pushed up and got off of

Mr. Burtness, left the room, and returned.

(Tr., p.202, Ls.20-24; Tr., p.185, Ls.9-10,

p.186, L.7.)
When he returned, Ms. Reichart testified that she witnessed Mr. Burtness strike
Mr. McCullough with the knife splaying his arm.

(Tr., p.187, Ls.1-11.)

Ms. Reichart

testified that Mr. Burtness followed Mr. McCullough outside. (Tr., p.192, Ls.2-3.) When
Mr. Burtness returned to the residence, he ordered her to leave, and she grabbed
Mr. McCullough's daughter and went outside.
911

called

and

after

a

neighbor arrived

(Tr., p.193, Ls.20-22.)
to

help

Ms. Reichart

Mr. McCullough,

she

took

IVlr. McCullough's daughter to her grandparents' house and returned to Mr. McCullough
a short time later. (Tr., p.195, Ls.11-12, 23-24, p.210, Ls.8-10.)

Course of Proceedings
The prosecuting attorney charged Mr. Burtness with the crime of aggravated
battery.

(R., pp.116-117.)

Mr. Burtness argued that he acted in self-defense.

5

The

State recognized that its case was about credibility of the witnesses and started the
opening arguments by stating:
You are going to hear from Daniel McCullough and Valerie Reichart, Dan
and Val. Ladies and gentlemen, they are going to take the stand. They
are going to raise their hand, swear to tell the truth, the whole truth and
nothing but the truth. And they are going to tell you .... "
(Tr., p.69, Ls.10-18.) Again recognizing that the evidence of this case was a he-saidshe-said case, the prosecutor stated the following to the jury:
From the evidence presented. What we have in evidence in this trial,
ladies and gentlemen, is the testimony of Valerie and Dan.
Ladies and gentlemen, they both took this stand. They swore to tell
the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth. The evidence shows
you that they are credible. When you were watching Valerie and Dan
testify, what was their demeanor like? Were they evasive and hostile, like
some of the defense witnesses we saw? Were they consistent with each
other? Were they aggravated [sic]?
Did they look like they were
searching for answers?
No.
The evidence, the demeanor, their
presentation on the stand (Tr., p.495, Ls.8-20.)
Mr. Burtness objected to the State's argument.

(Tr., p.495, Ls.21-24.)

The

district court sustained the objection. (Tr., p.495, L.25.) The court instructed the jury to
disregard the comments regarding the demeanor of the defense witnesses. (Tr., p.496,
Ls.1-2.)

Then the State took its argument one step further and stated, "Look to the

State's witnesses. Look to Valerie. Look to Dan. Do you feel like they were lying to
you?

I respectfully submit they came across as genuine.

For that reason you can

believe them." (Tr., p.496, Ls.3-7.)
Mr. Burtness again objected, explaining that the prosecutor was inappropriately
vouching for the State's witnesses.

(Tr., p.496, Ls.8-11.)

He requested a mistrial.

(Tr., p.496, Ls.10-11.) The prosecutor tried to explain that he was specifically referring

6

to the evidence and denied committing misconduct. (Tr., p.496, Ls.15-17.) The district
court denied the motion. (Tr., p.496, Ls.1

7.)

The jurors informed the bailiff that they were deadlock for nearly an hour.
(Tr., p.521, Ls.5-8.)
verdict.

However, before bringing in the jurors, the jury returned with a

(Tr., p.521, Ls.12-17.)

The jurors found Mr. Burtness guilty as charged.

(Tr., p.522, Ls.2-9; R., p.232.) The district court imposed upon him a unified sentence
of ten years, with three years fixed, suspended for four years.
Mr. Burtness appealed. (R., pp.8-9.)

7

(R., pp.255-264.)

ISSUE
Did the state violate Mr. Burtness' right to a fair trial by vouching for the State's
witnesses?

8

ARGUMENT
The State Violated Mr. Burtness' Right To A Fair Trial By Vouching For The State's
Witnesses
A.

Introduction
"[l]t [is] the duty of the Government to establish ... guilt beyond a reasonable

doubt. This notion-basic in our law and rightly one of the boasts of a free society-is a
requirement and a safeguard of due process of law in the historic, procedural content of
'due process.' Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 802-803 (1952) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting). The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution states that, "[n]o
person shall be ... deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law. U.S.
Const. amend. V. Similarly, the Fourteenth Amendment states, "[n]o state shall deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law .... "
amend. XIV.

U.S. Const.

Additionally, the Idaho Constitution also guarantees that, "[n]o person

shall be ... deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law." Id. Idaho
Const. art. I, § 13. Due process requires criminal trials to be fundamentally fair.

Schwarlzmiller v. Winters, 99 Idaho 18, 19 (1978).

Prosecutorial misconduct may so

unfairly contaminate the trial as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due
process. State v. Sanchez, 142 Idaho 309, 318 (Ct. App. 2005); Greer v. Miller, 483
U.S. 756, 765 (1987). In order to constitute a due process violation, the prosecutorial
misconduct must be of sufficient consequence to result in the denial of the defendant's
right to a fair trial.

Id.

The hallmark of due process analysis in cases of alleged

prosecutorial misconduct is the fairness of the trial, not the culpability of the prosecutor.

Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 219 (1982).

The aim of due process is not the

punishment of society for the misdeeds of the prosecutor but avoidance of an unfair trial
to the accused. Id.
9

B.

Standard Of Review
Because Mr. Burtness' prosecutorial misconduct claims are grounded in

constitutional principles, they involve questions of law over which this Court exercises
free review. City of Boise v. Frazier, 143 Idaho 1, 2 (2006). Trial error ordinarily will not
be addressed on appeal unless a timely objection was made in the trial court. State v.
Adams, 147 Idaho 857, 861 (Ct. App. 2009). For alleged errors for which there was a

timely objection, Mr. Burtness only has the duty to prove that an error occurred, "at
which point the State has the burden of demonstrating that the error is harmless beyond

a reasonable doubt." State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 222 (2010).
C.

The State Violated Mr. Burtness' Right To A Fair Trial By Committing
Prosecutorial Misconduct During Closing Arguments
Closing argument, "serves to sharpen and clarify the issues for resolution by the

trier of fact in a criminal case."

State v. Phillips, 144 Idaho 82, 86 (Ct. App. 2007)

(quoting Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853, 862 (1975)). Its purpose, "is to enlighten
the jury and to help the jurors remember and interpret the evidence." Id. (quoting
State v. Reynolds, 120 Idaho 445, 450 (Ct. App. 1991 )). "Both sides have traditionally

been afforded considerable latitude in closing argument to the jury and are entitled to
discuss fully, from their respective standpoints, the evidence and the inferences to be
drawn therefrom."

Id. (quoting State v. Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267, 280 (2003)).

However, considerable latitude has its limits, both in matters expressly stated and those
implied. Id.

10

Mr. Burtness asserts the following statements by the prosecutor constituted
prosecutorial misconduct, which violated Mr. Burtness' rights to due process and a fair
trial:
From the evidence presented. What we have in evidence in this
trial, ladies and gentlemen, is the testimony of Valerie and Dan.
Ladies and gentlemen, they both took this stand. They swore to tell
the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth. The evidence shows
you that they are credible. When you were watching Valerie and Dan
testify, what was their demeanor like? Were they evasive and hostile, like
some of the defense witnesses we saw? Were they consistent with each
other? Were they aggravated [sic]? Did they look like they were
No.
The evidence, the demeanor, their
searching for answers?
presentation on the stand (Tr., p.495, Ls.8-20.)
Mr. Burtness objected to the State's argument.

(Tr., p.495, Ls.21-24.)

The

district court sustained the objection. (Tr., p.495, L.25.) The court instructed the jury to
disregard the comments regarding the demeanor of the defense witnesses. (Tr., p.496,
Ls.1-2.)
Mr. Burtness asserts that the next statements made by the prosecutor continued
with the prosecutor's misconduct, which violated his rights to due process and a fair
trial: "Look to the State's witnesses. Look to Valerie.

Look to Dan. Do you feel like

they were lying to you? I respectfully submit they came across as genuine. For that
reason you can believe them." (Tr., p.496, Ls.3-7.)
Mr. Burtness again objected, explaining that the prosecutor was inappropriately
vouching for the State's witnesses. (Tr., p.496, Ls.8-11.) He also requested a mistrial.
(Tr., p.496, Ls.10-11.) The prosecutor tried to explain that he was specifically referring
to the evidence and denied committing misconduct. (Tr., p.496, Ls.15-17.) The district
court did not instruct the jury about the misconduct and told the prosecutor to "please
state your argument and explain exactly what you meant." (Tr., p.496, Ls.15-17.)
11

Prosecutors too often forget that they are a part of the machinery of the court,
and that they occupy an official position, which necessarily leads jurors to give more
credence to their statements, actions, and conduct in the course of the trial and in the
presence of the jury than they will give to counsel for the accused.

State v. /,win, 9

Idaho 35, 71 P. 608,610 (1903). The prosecutor's duty is to see that the defendant has
a fair trial by presenting only competent evidence and should avoid presenting evidence
to prejudice the minds of the jury. Id. The prosecutor must refrain from deceiving the
jury by use of inappropriate inferences. Id.
A prosecutor may not impart to the jury his belief that a government
witness is credible. United States v. McKay, 771 F.2d 1207, 1210-11 (9th
Cir.1985). Such improper vouching may occur in at least two ways. The
prosecutor may either "place the prestige of the government behind the
witness or ... indicate that information not presented to the jury supports
the witness's testimony." Roberts, 618 F.2d at 533. When the credibility
of witnesses is crucial, improper vouching is particularly likely to
jeopardize the fundamental fairness of the trial. United States v. Molina,
934 F.2d 1440, 1445 (9th Cir.1991).
U.S. v. Edwards, 154 F.3d 915, 921 (9th Cir, 1998).

Recently, in State v. Carson, 151 Idaho 713 (2011 ), the Idaho Supreme Court
addressed a question of prosecution vouching during the course of trial. The Carson
Court noted that the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct prohibit such conduct by
either the prosecutor or defense counsel during trial.

Id. at 721 ("Idaho Rule of

Professional Conduct 3.4 provides, "A lawyer shall not ... in trial ... state a personal
opinion as to ... the credibility of a witness ... or the guilt or innocence of an accused.").
Additionally, the Court quoted the United States Supreme Court, providing that
The prosecutor's vouching for the credibility of witnesses and expressing
his personal opinion concerning the guilt of the accused pose two
12

dangers: such comments can convey the impression that evidence not
presented to the jury, but known to the prosecutor, supports the charges
against the defendant and can thus jeopardize the defendant's right to be
tried solely on the basis of the evidence presented to the jury; and the
prosecutor's opinion carries with it the imprimatur of the Government and
may induce the jury to trust the Government's judgment rather than its
own view of the evidence.

State v. Carson, 151 Idaho 713, 721 (2011) (quoting United States v. Young, 470 U.S.
1, 18-19 (1985)).

The Carson Court did not find that the prosecutor was making a

personal comment on the evidence; instead, she was responding to defense counsel's
allegation that the witness was the killer and pointing to the evidence that demonstrated
that the allegation was inconsistent with the evidence. Id. at 722.
The prosecutor's theme that their witnesses were more credible and that the
State believed them started early on, during opening statements.

The prosecutor

informed the jury that it would hear from three of its witnesses during the course of trial.
(Tr., p.69, Ls.7-10.)

Regarding two of the witnesses that were critical to each of the

party's self-defense theory, the State stated,
You are going to hear from Daniel McCullough and Valerie Reichart, Dan and
Val. Ladies and gentlemen, they are going to take the stand. They are going to
raise their hand, swear to tell the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth.
And they are going to tell you .... "
(Tr., p.69, Ls.10-18.) While all of the witnesses were obviously going to take an oath to
swear to tell the truth, the State placed special emphasis on its two witnesses that
would support its theory of the case.

While there was no objection during opening

statements, the harmful misconduct did not occur until closing arguments when the
prosecutor again put its power of the State's approval behind the two witnesses. The
State returned to its initial theme that although everyone that testified swore to tell their
truth, its witnesses were special - the prosecution rlighlighted that their two key
witnesses swore to tell the truth and they were more credible. (Tr., p.495, Ls.11-20.)
13

Even after an objection and the court's warning, the State again stated that it believed
its witnesses came across as genuine and, therefore, the State believed the witnesses
and the jurors should too. (Tr., p.496, Ls.6-7.) The State vouched for the credibility of
its witnesses in a case where the only issue was whether the jurors believed the
defendant acted in self-defense or believed the victim that he had not done anything to
start the fight.

The State's actions were not like Carson where it was simply

commenting on the defense's theory of the case and pointing to the evidence that
demonstrated it was not credible; instead, the State put their witnesses on a pedestal
and insisted it believed it and, therefore, the jury should too.
The prosecutor presented his opinion that its witnesses were more credible then
the defense's and, therefore, Mr. Burtness was lying and had fabricated his testimony.
Mr. Burtness has a fundamental right to have the jury be the fact finder and to judge the
credibility of each witness.

The prosecutor in tr1is case impermissibly attempted to

remove the role of judging the credibility of each witness from the jury by improperly
expressing his opinion about the truth or falsity of its own witnesses, vouching for their
credibility. In this case, the credibility of the witnesses was crucial and, therefore, the
impermissible opinion argument was significant enough to deprive Mr. Burtness of a fair
trial.

The misconduct interfered with the jury's ability to make an impartial decision,

thereby interfering with Mr. Burtness' Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury. The
State violated Mr. Burtness' right to a jury trial when the prosecutor attempted to
encroach upon the jury's vital and exclusive function to weigh the evidence or lack of
evidence presented.

"The right to a jury trial contained in the Sixth Amendment ...

includes the right to have the jury be 'the sole judge of the weight of the testimony.'
State v. Elmore, 154 Wash. App. 885, 228 P.3d 760 (WA 2010) (quoting State v. Lane,
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125 Wash.2d 825, 838, 889 P.2d 929 (WA 1995) (quoting State v. Crotts, 22 Wash.
245, 250-51, 60 P. 403 (1900)).
The misconduct in this case not only involved Mr. Burtness' state and federal
constitutional rights to due process, but also his federal and state constitutional rights to
a jury trial.

The prosecutorial misconduct requires vacation of the conviction.

In the

case at hand, this Court should find that the misconduct denied Mr. Burtness his right to
a fair trial because it cannot say beyond a reasonable doubt that misconduct did not
contribute to the verdict.

The case was based largely upon the credibility of the

witnesses present during the altercation between Mr. McCullough and Mr. Burtness.

D.

The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Burtness' Motion For A Mistrial On
The Basis Of This Misconduct
A motion for a mistrial is controlled by I.C.R. 29.1, which provides that, "[a]

mistrial may be declared upon motion of the defendant, when there occurs during the
trial an error or legal defect in the proceedings, or conduct inside or outside the
courtroom, which is prejudicial to the defendant and deprives the defendant of a fair
trial." I.C.R. 29.1 (a); State v. Canelo, 129 Idaho 386, 389 (Ct. App. 1996). The decision
whether to grant a mistrial rests within the sound discretion of the district court and,
absent an abuse of discretion, it will not be disturbed on appeal. Id.; State v. Atkinson,
124 Idaho 816,818 (Ct. App. 1993). The Court of Appeals has held that the question
on review is not whether the trial court reasonably exercised its discretion under the
circumstances existing when the motion was made; but, whether the event or events
which brought about the motion for mistrial constitute reversible error when viewed in
the context of the entire record. Id.
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In cases where juries have been exposed to extraneous information or other
improper influences, the Idaho Court of Appeals has followed an approach similar to the
approach adopted by the federal courts and declined to require a determination of
actual prejudice. Roll v. City of Middleton, 115 Idaho 833, 837 (Ct. App. 1989). These
courts have generally held that if the trial judge finds that the extraneous information
reasonably could have resulted in prejudice a new trial should be ordered. Id.
Consequently, the Idaho Court of Appeals has held that the proper standard is
whether prejudice reasonably could have occurred, rather than whether prejudice
actually has occurred. Id. The Court's holding relies on two considerations:
First, the extreme rigor of an actual prejudice test would severely restrict
the availability of relief for misconduct, thereby diminishing public
confidence in the jury system and eroding the fundamental principle that a
"verdict must be based upon the evidence developed at the trial." United
States v. Howard, 506 F.2d 865, 867 (5th Cir.1975) (quoting Irvin v. Dowd,
366 U.S. 717, 722 (1961)). Second, Rule 606(b), I.R.E., precludes a full
inquiry into actual prejudice. As mentioned above, Rule 606(b) bars jurors
from giving evidence concerning their mental processes. Because jurors
cannot be questioned as to whether they were in fact prejudiced by
extraneous information, the trial judge must determine whether the
information reasonably could have produced prejudice, when evaluated in
light of all the events and the evidence at trial.

Id.

Therefore, it is sufficient for the judge to merely determine whether prejudice

reasonably could have occurred. Id. at 839. In making this determination, courts must
give due regard to "the policy of assuring that jury verdicts are based upon the evidence
at trial, not upon extraneous information or improper influences." Id.
The improper influence in this case was the prosecutor vouching for the
credibility of key witnesses. This improper influence could have reasonably resulted in
prejudice in this case.

Given the improper actions of the prosecutor, Mr. Burtness

submits that the trial court erred when it denied his motion for a mistrial on the basis of
the prosecutor's vouching.
16

CONCLUSION

Mr. Burtness respectfully requests that the Judgment of Conviction be vacated
and the matter remanded for a new trial.
DATED this 16 th day of August, 2012.

Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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